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Information transfer issues associated with the dissemination of windshear alerts from the ground are studied.
T,_o of these issues are specifically addressed: the effectiveness of different cockpit presentations of ground-
measured infi)rmatinn and assessment of the windshear hazard from ground-based measurements. Information
transfer and presentation issues have been explored through pilot surveys and a part-task Boeing 767 "glass
cockpit" simulation. The survey produced an information base for study of crew-centered windsbear alert
design, whereas the part-ta_k simulations prowided useful data about modes of cockpit information presentation
for both windshear alert and ATC clearance delivery. Graphical map displays have been observed to be
exceptionally e/I_cient for presentation of position.critical alerts, and some problems 14.ri|b text displays have
been identified. Problems associated with hazard assessment of ground-measured windshear information have
also been identified.
I. Introduction
L OW-ALTITUDE windshear is the leading weather-re-Lated cause of fatal aviation accidents in the U.S. Since
1904. there have been 26 accidents attributed to windshear
resulting in over 500 fatalities.' z Low-altitude windshear can
take several forms, including macroscopic forms such as cold-
warm gustfronts down to the small, intense downdrafts known
as microbursts. Microbursts are particularly dangerous and
difficult to detect due to their small size. _hort duration, and
occurrence under both heasy precipitation and virtually dr,,'
conditions. For these reasons, the real-time detection of wind-
shear hazards is a very active field of research. Also. the
advent of digital grouncl-to-air datalinks and electronic flight
instrumentation opens up many options for implementation
of windshear aterts in the terminal area environment. Stud,,'
is required to determine the best content, format, timing, and
cockpit presentation of windshear alerts in the modern ATC
environment to best inform the flight crew without signifi-
cantly increasing crew workload
II. Ground-Based Windshear Detection and Warning
A. Ground.Based Detection Technology
Ground-based windshear detection will play a large role in
near-term windshear alerting and avoidance systems. The cur-
rently operational Low-Level Windshear Alert System
(LLWAS), networks of anemometers around an airport and
its approaches, are being expanded at some airports and are
more capable of detecting windshears that impact the ground
within the network boundaries. More importantly, ground-
based Doppler weather radar systems such as Terminal Dop-
pler Weather Radar (TDWR) and Doppler processing of ASR-
9 radar data are becoming available and are capable of
locating and measuring windshear events throughout the ter-
minal area. These systems will provide the core data for near-
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term windshear alerting systems. Airborne predictive (look-
ahead) sensors currently in the R&D phase--such as infrared
radiometers, airborne Doppler radars, and lidars--will sup-
ptement ground-derived data as they become available and
economically feasible. Airborne in sutu or reactive windshear
sensing, provided through comparison of airspeed measure-
ments with inertial accelerometer measurements, is a cur-
rentlv available technology that can provide flight crews with
warning once windshear penetration has occurred.
B. Integrated Ground-Based Systems
Assuming the near-term (early 1990s) deployment of both
ground-based DoppLer weather radars and the Mode-S ground-
to-air digital datalink, possible paths of information flow are
illustrated in Fig. 1. In this environment, data from LLWAS
and TDWR sensors can be combined with pilot reports (PI-
REPs) to form the current windshear database. These PIREPs
may be verbal or reported automatically by an airborne in-
ertial sensor over the digital datalink. This data then can be
processed to varying degrees and transmitted to the aircraft
via voice communications or digital datalink. Several issues
are raised by this implementation. One of these is the degree
of data processing done: this can range from transmission of
essentially raw data (as in the original LLWAS implemen-
tation, for example) or complete processing of the data into
an executive decision to close the runway. One consideration
is purely operational: what should be the distribution of de-
cision-making responsibility between the pilot and the ATC
controller? Another consideration is technical: given the
available weather information, what is the (quantitative) haz-
ard posed by the current weather situation to a particular
aircraft or aircraft type?
Another of these issues is the "'crew interface." the pro-
cedure and method used to inform the crew of a hazard. An
essential difficulty in presenting windshear information is the
need for alerts during descent and final approach, which are
high workload phases of flight. For this reason, design of the
crew interface is critical: a poor interface will result in loss of
information or increased crew workload. The advent of elec-
tronic cockpits and digital ground-to-air datalink opens up a
variety of options for implementation of the crew interface.
Some issues to be examzned include information content, mes-
sage format, and mode of presentation.
C. Research Focus
The specific focus of this research has been the evaluation,
transmission, and presentation of ground-based Doppler
Supported by government grant. See Acknowledgments.
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Fig. I Integrated ground-based windshear alerting system.
weather radar derived information through a limited band-
width digital datalink (Mode-S). The first issue studied is the
content and cockpit presentation of uplinked windshear alerts.
User input was solicited through pilot opinion surveys and
then used to design a part-task simulation experiment. The
primary results deal with the use of electronic instrumentation
for presentation of uplinked information, specifically the rel-
ative merits and disadvantages of voice, alphanumeric (tex-
tual}, and graphical modes of presentation. In this context,
voice or verbal mode refers to standard ATC radio commu-
nications, alphanumeric or textual mode refers to presentation
(on some electronic or paper device) of the literal text of a
message, and graphical mode refers to a combined picto-
rial/text presentation of the alert information on some elec-
tronic map or map-like display. Alphanumeric and graphical
presentations presuppose the existence of a ground-to-air dig-
ital datalink.
The second issue examined is the evaluation of ground-
measured windshear data to determine a hazard index. This
hazard index should both be able to accurately quantify the
windshear hazard present and be used to generate a mean-
ingful alert for the flight crew. Overwarning must be mini-
mized, since a large number of false or nuisance alerts can
disrupt airport operations and damage pilot confidence in the
alerting system. Preliminary. analysis has identified some of
the issues and problems involved, and further work is in prog-
ress.
IlL Crew Interface Issues
A. Pilot Opinion Surveys
To obtain user input on both current windshear alert sys-
tems and requirements for future systems, a pilot opinion
survey was conducted. With the cooperation of the Airline
Pilots Association and United Airlines. responses were col-
lected from 51 line pilots of transport category aircraft with
autoflight s wtems (Boeing 757, 767. 747-400). Significantly,
51% of the respondents have had what they considered to be
a hazardous windshear encounter; most of these occurred at
Denver-Stapleton airport, a UAL hub and an area noted for
heavy microburst activity during the summer months. It should
also be noted, however, that pilots who have had a hazardous
windshear encounter may have been more likely to respond
to the survey. Some general results are the following:
1) Most of the pilots (90%) agreed that "'microbursts pose
a major safety hazard to transport category, aircraft."
2) Only 15% of the respondents agreed that "currently
available windshear alert data is sufficient for safe operation
in the terminal area.'" while 44% disagreed.
3) All but one (98%) of the pilots felt that "'a system to
provide aircrews with better and more timely windshear alerts
is necessary."
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Fig. l Pilot rankings of po_ible relay/presentatlon modes for ground-
generated wind shear alerts.
These responses clearly indicate that pilots are dissatisfied
with current windshear alert data and would be receptive to
improvements. The pilots were also asked to rate the use-
fulness of currently available windshear data. Significantly,
PIREPs and visual clues were rated more useful for windshear
avoidance than LLWAS. However, neither PIREPs or visual
information are always available. This emphasizes the need
for improved remote detection and advance warning and the
importance of good PIREP collection and distribution. A
digital datalink would be very useful in this application.
Another set of questions dealt specifically with the use of
a ground-to-air datalink and an EFIS to display windshear
(specifically microburst) alerts. Responses indicated that pi-
lots are receptive to graphic displays (Fig. 2). The specific
suggestion of integrating windshear information with an EF1S
moving map display was strongly supported, ranking 4.3 out
of 5. Also of interest was the high preference for ATC voice
alerts (3.9/5), which is likely a result of a practiced ability to
interpret radio communications. Display of wind shear alerts
on some alternate graphical display (other than the EFIS
moving map) was also ranked above alphanumeric displays
and ATIS. Comments indicated that the low ranking of ATIS
was due to the long time between updates.
Due to time limitations of VHF verbal communications and
bit limitations of digital datalinks, the amount of information
space available for a given alert is limited. For this reason.
message content is critical. Thus, a question dealing with the
message content of microburst alerts was included. The re-
sponses indicated that location and intensity of microbursts
are clearly the most important items of information. Size.
microburst movement, and intensity trends are of secondary.
importance. Ranking of this information allows design of alerts
that fit within the message length constraints and still retain
enough information to be useful. In this case, the data indi-
cates that the message must include location and intensity.
Later comments from the part-task simulation experiment
subjects indicated that sizewould be desirable also, since it
is in some sense related to the intensity.
The survey also addressed timing of microburst alem. There
was no consensus as to in what phase of flight (i.e., when
during the descent and approach) alerts should be given; the
most common response was "as soon as detected." This topic
needs to be further examined, since the high workload en-
vironment during terminal area operations makes timing of
the warning crucial.
A codistributed survey was specifically concerned with use
of a Flight Management Computer (FMC) in concert with an
EF1S and was intended to evaluate crew acceptance and use
patterns of these automated systems. Regardless of flight hours
with the FMC, pilots expressed a decided preference for au-
tomated aircrah over nonautomated ones, with an overall
mean of 82%. In general, crews were enthusiastic about the
EFIS. which supported the preference for graphical alerts
expressed during the windshear survey. The complete findings
from this survey are presented in Ref. 3.
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B. Fllglat Simulator Study
The purpose of the part-task simulator study was to com-
pare message presentation modes--verbal, alphanumeric, and
graphical as defined in Sec. It. C--on a modern "glass cock-
pit" aircraft. This was done for both uplinked microburst
windshear alerts and for ATC clearance amendments in the
terminal area.
Simulator Design
The Boeing 757/767 class of aircraft with its Electronic Flight
Instrumentation System (EFIS) was (approximately) simu-
lated (Fig. 3). The primary instrumentation was displayed on
an IRIS 2400T color graphics workstation. It included a good
fidelity representation of the EFIS displays, including the EHSI
and the Electronic Attitude Director Indicator (EAD[). Air-
speed and altitude were displayed as moving tapes (as in the
747-400 aircraft), and a vertical speed indicator was also in-
cludea. A window for display of alphanumeric wind shear
alerts was provided. A low-priority tracking sidetask was in-
cluded for workload adjustment and monitoring. The EHSI
display was controlled through an external control panel that
allowed the pilot to change EHSI modes (MAP or ILS) and
the display range and to suppress unwanted off-route infor-
mation.
The Control Display Unit (CDU) for data entry into the
FMC was simulated with an IBM/XT computer. It provided
the necessary subset of the FMC functions required for the
simulation. Non-F'MC control of the aircraft was performed
through an autopilot panel, similar to the glareshield panel
on the 757/'767. The standard autothrottle and autoflight sys-
tems were available, including FMC-programmed lateral and
vertical path guidance and the various capture ("select") and
hold modes for airspeed, heading, vertical speed, and altitude
guidance.
An ATC workstation was located in a separate area. The
controller received live audio and video of the simulation area.
which were recorded. The controller monitored the experi-
ment, controlled the timing of ATC clearances and windshear
alerts, and communicated with the pilot through a voice link.
This experiment was concerned with cognitive decision-
making issues rather than the details of pilot performance.
Therefore, controls and instruments not related to the par-
titular cognitive task at hand were not simulated. The lack
of a copilot and imposition of a sidetask compensated for the
workload loss. The subjects generally agreed that the simu-
lation was accurate for the tasks they were asked to perform.
Also, no windshear dynamics were included, in that the data
of interest was the go/no-go decision and whether or not pen-
etration occurred. The major advantages of the part-task sim-
ulator are the ease of setup and operation and the flexibility
of the electronic displays. Alphanumeric and graphical mes-
sage formats are easy to implement and change.
Scenarm Deslgn
Nine descent and approach scenarios into the Denver-Sta-
pleton airport were devised. The Denver terminal area was
selected for two reasons: 1) the high incidence of dry micro-
burst activity observed there, and 2) the large number of
possible descent profile and landing runway combinations.
The inclusion of both ATC amendments and microburst alerts
in the same scenario was useful in preventing the subject from
anticipating repeated windshear alerts.
Each scenario was divided into two phases. The aircraft
started at the outer limit of the termtnal area with an initial
flight plan, which was preprogrammed into the FMC. During
descent, three amendments that required reprogramming of
the FMC for compliance were given. Of these, one was "'un-
acceptable," implying that the pilot should have taken some
corrective action such as requesting clarification or a new
routing. The pilot was unaware that any of the amendments
were going to be unacceptable.
The second phase of the scenario began when the aircraft
was vectored onto the final approach course. Windshear alerts
could occur after this point. Microbursts were positioned either
as a threat on the approach path or as a nonthreat on the
approach or departure end of another runway. In addition.
microbursts were sometimes positioned on the missed ap-
proach path. The alert was given either close in (at the outer
marker, 6 to 9 n.mi. from touchdown) or further out (20 n.ml..
with a second message at 10 n.mi. from the runway threshold).
The microburst alerts always contained warnings for all pos-
sible approach runways, not only the one being used by the
simulated aircraft. This was to measure the pilot's ability to
discriminate between threatening and nonthreatening situa-
tions.
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Fill. 3 Boeing 757/767 part.task simulator.
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Fig. 4
The nine scenarios were divided into three sets of three by
presentation mode. In each block, all amendments and wind-
:shear alerts were given in the assigned mode: verbal, alpha-
numeric, or graphical. Verbal clearance amendments were
given according to current ATC operating procedures. Al-
phanumeric clearance amendments were activated remotely
by the controller, generating an audible alert. The text of the
message appeared on the CDU screen when called up by the
pilot. In the graphical mode, activated clearance amendments
appeared on the EHSI as an alternate route (dashed white
line). These could be accepted or rejected with a single CDU
keystroke. Pilots were not required to read back text or graph-
ical amendments.
Verbal microburst alerts were given as radio messages by
the controller. Text microburst alerts appeared in an alpha-
numeric window just below the EHSI display. The following
is a typical verbal or text alert: "IRIS 354, Microburst Alert.
Expect four-zero knot loss, 2 mile final approach runway one-
.,;even-left." Graphical microburst alerts appeared in the ap-
propriate location on the EHSI map (in both MAP and ILS
mode) as flashing white circles with the intensity (headwind-
to-tailwind divergence value in knots) drawn inside them. An
example is shown on the ILS mode display in Fig. 4. Verbal
cues were given (i.e., "IRIS 354. Microburst alert.") in all
modes, so that the method and time of initial notification
were kept constant. This would not be true of an actual cock-
pit, where an automated audible alert would most likely be
used. Over the subjects tested, all scenario blocks were tested
in all the modes, and the order in which the subject encoun-
tered the modes was rotated. This process was used to atten-
uate learning and scenario-dependent effects.
With the approval of the Air Line Pilots' Association, eight
active 757/'767 line pilots volunteered for the experiment. The
subjects were all male; five were captains, and three were
first officers. The pilots ranged in age from 30 to 59 years,
with a mean of 47 years. In addition, several other pilots of
varying experience assisted in the development of the simu-
lator and the scenarios.
Experimental Procedure
At the start of the session, the pilot was asked to complete
the first stage of a NASA-designed workload evaluation,'
which asked him to prioritize the different types of workload
for the specific task of flying a 757/767 aircraft. Next, the
features of the simulator were demonstrated. A sample sce-
nario was used to demonstrate all of the three modes for both
phases of flight. When the subject became comfortable with
the operation of the simulator, the test scenarios began. At
the start of each scenario, the pilot was given an initial clear-
ance into Denver-Stapleton and had all the necessary charts
io make the approach. Each of the nine scenarios lasted from
Boeing 757/767 EHSI display modes: MAP (left) and ILS (right).
20 to 35 rain. During the flights, one of the experimenters
served as the ATC controller and one remained in the cockpit
with the pilot to answer questions about physical operation
of the simulator. After each scenario the pilot completed a
separate subjective workload evaluation sheet for the descent
phase (the clearance amendment task) and for the approach
phase (when microburst alerts were given). After all of the
scenarios, there was a debriefing session in which the pilot's
impressions of the simulator and the presentation modes were
solicited.
Results
Three forms of numerical data--pilot performance, work-
load. and preference--were taken. The measure of pilot per-
formance for the microburst alerts was the percentage of"cor-
rect decisions" made in each presentation mode. An incorrect
decision was scored for either I) avoidance action taken when
none was necessary, or 2) no avoidance action was taken in
a clearly hazardous situation. The fewest incorrect decisions
(8%) were made with graphical microburst alerts, the next
fewest (17%) with verbal alerts, and the most (27%) were
made with text alerts. This indicates that text alerts may ac-
tually degrade performance relative to verbal alerts, likely
due to the greater comprehension time associated with read-
ing the text message. It is also important to note that pilots
are very. experienced and comfortable with verbal radio com-
munications. The positional information contained in the
graphical mode actually led several pilots to request and pro-
gram nonstandard missed approach procedures in advance to
avoid the windshear areas completely. When the pilots were
given the information in the other modes, this was generally
not observed.
The NASA Task Load IndeP was selected to assess work-
load for both tasks in each of the modes. This scale divides
workload into six components: mental demand, physical de-
mand. temporal demand, effort, frustration, and perfor-
mance. The ratings were made along a continuum from "'very
low" to "very, high." Weight)rigs for each of the aforemen-
tioned six factors are obtained individually for each subject
through a paired comparison task during subject orientation.
The weights are simply the number of times a particular com-
ponent was chosen to be a more important contributor to
workload.
The overall workload ratings for each mode are plotted in
Fig. 5. For both tasks, workload for the graphical mode was
significantly lower than the workload for the verbal and tex-
tual modes. The six subscale ratings all showed a similar trend.
The appearance of greater workload induced by lhe textual
condition is not a significant effect.
Pilot comments and subjective evaluations of the presen.
tat)on modes were obtained through loosely structured post-
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experiment interviews. In their evaluation of the modes, pilots
overwhelmingly preferred the graphical mode of communi-
cation (Fig. 6), which is consistent with the survey results.
For the windshear alerts, the text mode was consistently rated
less desirable than the verbal mode. This was not the case for
clearance amendments. Although the text and verbal modes
seemed to be equally desirable from the averaged ratings, in
fact. some pilots greatly preferred the text mode over the
verbal, while others preferred the exact opposite (hence the
midrange average value). All pilots indicated that they were
comfortable with current verbal procedures, though, so they
did not feel that the advantages of the text mode were sig-
nificant.
Some further observations were taken from the expert-
mentors' notes and pilots" comments. First, textual alerts _ven
in time.critical situations, such as final approach, were thought
to require too much head-down time. Second. digitally trans-
mitted information in either mode. textual or graphical, leads
to a loss of voice inflection information. Since controllers
sometimes use voice inflection to diszinguisl_ urgent aJerts
from normal communications, this is in some sense a loss of
information. Third. digitally transmitted information, if di-
rected to specific aircraft, prevents pilots from hearing in-
structions given to other aircraft in the terminal area ("party-
line'" information). Some pilots stated that hearing the com-
munications to other aircraft in the vicinity gave them a better
understanding of the overall situation and enabled them to
be better prepared when an alert arrived. Other pilots indi-
cated that they could do without the information.
To obtain the benefits of graphical messages, the detailed
format of such messages must be carefully designed to present
only the necessary information in clear fashion without clutter
or data overload. In the case of windshear alerts, the pilots
identified this minimum presentation to be a simple symbol
showing location, approximate size. and intensity. The pro-
posed Mode-S datalink, for example, allows 48 bits of useful
information every -t to 12 seconds in surveillance mode. This
minimum alert presentation can likely be expressed in 24. bits
or less, allowing two messages per scan. Therefore. the Mode-
S link can possibly be used to display and track several ml-
crobursts, while keeping up with the I minute update rate
achieved by TDWR in the current configuration.
IV. Hazard Assessment
The successful implementation of ground-measured wind-
shear alerts requires an effective way of quantifying the wind-
shear hazard. This hazard criterion must provide an accurate
estimate of the danger to approaching and departing aircraft
tfat can be easily interpreted by ,'fie flight crew. To maintain
pilot confidence in a ground-based windshear avoidance svs-
tem. an alert must correlate with what the aircraft is expe-
riencing or will experience. Otherwise, even an accurate
measurement can be perceived as a false alarm.
The alerting criterion used in the recent TDWR operational
evaluations at Denver-Stapelton and Kansas City Interna-
tional airports (and in current testing, as well) is based on
horizontal wind measurements. When a change in low-alti-
tude horizontal winds above a threshold is measured (radial
from me radar), the area is marked and quantified by the
maximum radial shear measured within it. If this area is within
the segments identified in Fig. 7. an alert is issued, e°
One problem with this system is that a microburst that
occurs in one of the boxes may in one case never encroach
on the flight path and in another be right on the center of it.
In either case. the same alert is issued. This means that ap-
proaching or departing aircraft may fly through the center of
a microburst or almost entirely miss it. experiencing the entire
event or nothing at all. This could be perceived as a false
alarm by the pilot, although the windshear is present and may
even be fairly close to his position. A recent report about the
1988 TDWR Operational Evaluation indicates that this could
be a major issue.' Data was collected from Ill pilots who
landed or took off during alert periods. (Since the microburst
alerting software changed over the course of the 1988 Op-
erational Evaluation. the pilot responses included in this cal-
culation were those pilots who not only were alerted but also
would have been alerted by the final version of the warning
algorithm. The earlier version of the algorithm produced more
alerts than the final one.) Of this group. 34% indicated that
"nothing was encountered," whereas another 31% reported
something like "'nothing much was encountered." A "nui-
sance alarm" rate this high can unnecessarily disrupt airport
operations as well as damage pilot confidence in the windshear
alert system.
A portion of this problem may also stem from the lntensit','
quantity used. The windshear quantity used in the alerts is
derived from the maximum change in radial velocity over the
area of shear. This number is reported in the alert as an X
"'... knot airspeed loss." In reality, for an axisymmetric mi-
croburst, this number represents about an X/2 airspeed gain
followed by an X knot loss. This is not a reporting error, but
crews shouJd be aware l.ba[ the quantity being measured Js
the maximum horizontal wind change over the shear and that
the maximum airspeed loss relative to the reference airspeed
before penetration is approximately one-half of the reported
value.
Departure Runway Approach
I *t •
The alert corresponding to the 40 knot micmburat pictured above
might be:"Uni_,'d 226. Denver tower, threshold wind one six zero
at six. expect a forty knot loss on three mile finaL"
FiR. 7 Windshear reportinR zones for approach and departure: 1988
TD_._,R operational e_aluation.
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A more fundamental difficulty in using wind change or
"airspeed loss" as the hazard criterion is that the hazard due
to a microburst windfield is primarily a function of horizontal
wind gradient and downdraft velocity rather than overall hor-
izontal windshear. The critical danger is loss of aircraft total
energy, which can be usefully defined as the sum of air-mass
relative kinetic energy and potential energy measured with
respect to ground level. The impact of the immediate wind-
field on the aircraft's rate of energy loss has been quantified
by some researchers* as "F-factor"
F-_-_ W, W_
g r (1)
where W, is horizontal wind velocity (tailwind positive), g is
gravitational acceleration, W h is vertical wind velocity (up-
draft positive), and V is aircraft airspeed.
This quantity indicates the loss of climb rate (or effective
excess thrust-to-weight ratio) due to the immediate windfield.
It is clear, through examination of the windshear hazard in
energy terms, that the energy loss the aircraft experiences can
take the form of either airspeed or altitude loss. The pro-
portion of these is a function of the control strategy employed.
Therefore. F is a more compelling measure of the potential
rerformance loss due to a microburst than total divergence.
Wind change, however, is convenient for intensity mea-
surement since it can be measured directly by a ground-based
Doppler radar. There are several problems with using ground-
based radar measurements to estimate F. One is the inability
to directly measure vertical wind velocity. A second relates
to altitude variance. Microburst windfields can vary, strongly
over the lowest 1000 ft above ground level (AGL). A radar
scan beam used for microburst detection has a finite beam-
width on the order of 0.5-1 deg. For a radar situated several
miles from the airport (typical for TDWR), this implies that
the radial velocity measurements are a weighted average over
the lowest 500-1000 ft AGL. This makes estimation of peak
horizontal shear more difficult.
A third difficulty is microburst asymmetry. For divergence
estimating purposes, the asymmetry ratio of a microburst can
be defined as the ratio of shear in the direction of maximum
divergence to shear in the direction of minimum divergence.
One study of Colorado microbursts 9 indicated an average
a.symmetry ratio of greater than 2 with extreme cases greater
than 5; asymmetries of up to 5.5 were also measured in Okla-
homa downbursts._° This indicates that a single Doppler mea-
surement of one radial microburst slice (not aligned with the
flight path) can significantly over or underestimate the shear
along the flight path.
The problem is then estimation of Fgiven the measurement
limitations. The TDWR measurement of radial velocity also
contains an estimate of microburst size (diameter along the
radial slice), as well as the locations of other microbursts that
may interact with the local wind feld of global knowledge to
identify and estimate F using characteristics. The reflectivity
field is also known. The microburst itself can be modeled
either with a suitable fluid dynamic model of microburst winds
and/or measured statistics of naturally occurring microbursts.
It should then be possible to combine the measured data with
the microburst models to estimate the peak downdraft, peak
horizontal shear, and hence the peak F that could be en-
countered within the microburst. Provided this problem can
be solved, use of estimated F-factor as a hazard criterion for
alert generation could reduce overwarning.
Another way to reduce "nuisance alerts." specifically in the
case of microbursts laterally displaced with respect to the flight
path, could be accomplished by modifications of the alert
format. One pos,_ible change (proposed in Ref. 7) is to add
the words "'left." "right." or "center" to the alert to indicate
the microburst position relative to the flight path.
Independent of changes in the hazard criterion or the alert
format, the detrimental effects of nnisance alerts could be
reduced by clarifying the actual meaning of the currently em-
ployed alert to flight crews. The possibility of a microburst
being to the side of the flight path should be discussed, and
the meaning of the microburst wind change value should be
explained. Crews should also be aware of the measurement
limitations of the sensing system.
V. Conclusions
A pilot opinion survey and a flight simulator experiment
have been performed to examine issues related to dissemi-
nation of ground-measured windshear information to flight
crews with and without a digital datalink. Survey results in-
dicated that the currently available windshear avoidance in-
formation is not sufficient and that a better system is highly
desirable. A preference for graphically presented microburst
alerts was expressed, and some specific questions about the
makeup and timing of microburst alerts were answered.
Simulation experimental results indicated that presentation
of windshear alerts as graphical symbols on a moving-map
display is significantly more effective than verbal alerts. Pilot
performance improved, and pilot workload decreased. Both
the survey results and comments from the simulation subjects
indicated a strong pilot preference for graphical presentations.
Presentation of windsbear alerts as text on an electronic dis-
play proved inferior to standard verbal communications in
terms of workload increase, pilot performance, and pilot pref-
erence. In the time-critical situation of windshear alerts, it
was apparent that textual messages were more subject to mis-
interpretation than were verbal ones.
It is critical to the implementation of a ground-based wind-
shear alerting system to quantify, the windshear hazard both
accurately and clearly. Overwarning can unnecessarily disrupt
airport operations as well as damage pilot confidence in the
windshear alert system. The system used in the 1988 TDWR
Operational Evaluation was shown to result in a significant
number of nuisance alerts, for which the pilots reported ex-
periencing little or no windshear.' To address this problem.
it is proposed that i) a better method of assessing the wind-
shear hazard be developed, and that 2) flight crews be better
educated about the meaning of ground-generated windshear
alerts.
The current method of generating windshear alerts from
TDWR information has been examined, and some causes of
overwarning have been identified. These causes fall into two
groups: 1) the alert generation methodology, and 2) difficul-
ties in quantifying microburst hazard from the available mea-
surements.
Educating flight crews about the meaning of ground-gen-
erated alerts is equally as important as good hazard assess-
ment. Some possible pilot errors in interpretation of the cur-
rent alert format have been identified. By better informing
flight crews about the details of the alerts and the limitations
of the sensor system, the inevitable "nuisance alerts" that will
be issued will not damage crew confidence in the system.
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